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Virtue Ethics (VE) is a way of thinking about how to behave well which has not received 
a great deal of attention within the discipline of International Relations (IR) or the 
practice of international politics. Dominant approaches to international ethics focus on 
the identification or development of moral rules or duties (deontological approaches) or, 
to a lesser extent, the consequences of actions (consequentialist approaches). Virtue 
ethics, in contrast, emphasises the importance of moral character – in particular the 
possession of some combination of ‘virtues’, including practical wisdom – in determining 
right action, and understands right action with reference to concrete conceptions of the 
good, or human flourishing. The relevance of this for IR is not immediately obvious, as 
VE focuses on individual character traits rather than on the kinds of ethical concepts 
more familiar to us in IR and political theory, such as rights, rules and norms. However, 
both the rejection of rule-based ethics offered by VE, and the key place in virtue-based 
approaches for virtues, flourishing and practical wisdom, challenge us to think about 






One of the most significant developments in contemporary IR has been the revival of 
interest in arguments concerning ethics. After years in which Walzian realist theory and 
political science methods dominated the discipline, many scholars are now concerned to 
discuss not (or at least not only) the ways that states, institutions and individuals must 
behave, given the constraints of the international system, but the ways that they should 
behave. This field of study (which is widely known as International Political Theory or 
IPT, but can also be described as global ethics, Hutchings 1999, Lang 2014) – has 
brought focus onto the duties that states have towards each other (Jackson 2000), towards 
their own citizens (Evans 2009), and towards foreign citizens (Wheeler 2000), as well as 
the universal rights that human beings may be able to claim against states, institutions 
and each other (Dunne & Wheeler 1999; Donnelly 2006; Vincent 1986; Shue 1980). 
                                                 
1
 I would like to thank Tarak Barkawi, Amanda Beattie, Jamie Gaskarth, Ben Holland, 
Joe Hoover, Kim Hutchings, Renee Jeffery, David Karp, Paul Kirby, Jan Klabbers, 
Anthony Lang, Alex Prichard and the attendees of the International Theory seminar at the 
London School of Economics for comments on versions of this essay, or illuminating 
discussions about the potential of virtue ethics in IR and international politics. 
 2 
Many international political theorists ground their work in the liberal philosophy 
of the Enlightenment – in particular that of Immanuel Kant – or build on the work of the 
political theorist who did most to bring Kantian thought into the twentieth century, John 
Rawls. Theorists in this tradition argue in favour of various forms of liberal universalist 
ethics and imagine various incarnations of a global liberal polity (for instance Beitz 1979; 
Caney 2005; Held 2004; O’Neill 2000; Pogge 2002). Following Kant’s emphasis on the 
centrality of duty and rules to moral life, these theorists usually support the spread of 
international law and regimes codifying, in particular, the moral obligations states and 
individuals have in respect of human rights and conduct in conflict. This work has been 
tremendously important in putting ethics on the agenda in international politics, but it is 
based, as explained below, on problematic foundations. These foundations have been 
contested in numerous ways in recent philosophy and political theory, much of which has 
found its way into IPT (for instance Cochran 1999; Erskine 2008; Hutchings 1999, 2010). 
However, virtue-based approaches, which challenge the notion of moral obligation itself, 
have not yet been fully explored within IPT scholarship. 
Before explaining the fundamentals of virtue ethics, this essay first sets out the 
context of its contemporary form. Interest in virtue ethics was revived in response to the 
refutations of moral obligation and of particular characterisations of moral arguments 
employed in modern moral philosophy, set out in the second half of the twentieth 
century. In response, virtue ethicists (most of whom are not ‘theorists’, which would be 
the usual shorthand, as they reject the value of theory in the study and practice of ethics), 
argue that character, practical reason and human flourishing are central to ethics – that 
the right question to ask when working out what it means to be ethical is not “what 
should I do” but “what sort of person should I be?”.  This position is explained and 
evaluated, after which the application of virtue ethics and its central concepts to IR, in 
particular IPT, is explored. The essay finishes with a discussion of possibilities for future 
research, arguing that virtue ethics offers us original ways to confront the kind of ethical 
dilemmas that we face in international affairs. 
 
Recanting Kant: the problem of obligation  
 
Virtue ethics is a diverse body of thought, developed over many centuries. Forms of VE 
were set out by Ancient Greek and Ancient Chinese philosophers and can be found 
within many religious traditions. Yet despite its prevalence as an ethical approach, VE 
was usurped in Western philosophy by approaches that judge right action either in 
reference to moral rules (deontology) or to the likely consequences of actions 
(consequentialism). Rather than giving equal weight to the various forms of VE which 
have found favour at different times (chapters by Kamtekar, Ivanhoe and Porter in 
Russell 2013 give excellent histories of VE), this essay focuses on contemporary VE and 
its relevance to IR. 
The story of the recent resurgence of VE starts in the late 1950s, with attacks on 
the notion of moral obligation found in secular moral theory, particularly Kantian 
philosophy, and on the nature of moral claims. In 1958, Anscombe published what 
transpired to be an enormously influential article attacking modern moral philosophy and 
calling for a return to ancient concerns. Anscombe argues that modern approaches to 
ethics (principally Kantian and utilitarian) take a law-based approach – they see morality 
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as stemming from law of some form, and as centrally concerned with defining duties and 
obligations. This trend in morality towards a focus on obligation became embedded, 
according to Anscombe, due to the rise of Christianity, which saw morality as proceeding 
from divine law. Rather than thinking about morality in terms of the virtues, as the 
Greeks did, ‘we’ (Western analytic philosophers, and, following them, Western political 
theorists) began to think in terms of obligation: “[i]n consequence of the dominance of 
Christianity for many centuries, the concepts of being bound, permitted or excused 
became deeply embedded in our language and thought” (Anscombe 1981: 30). However, 
she argues, law conceptions of ethics only make sense if there is a law-giver – an 
authoritative agent or place from which the laws emanate and which acts as a foundation 
to our obligations. In the past, this was God, but in contemporary society we do not share 
a conception of God that would allow us to view him as an authoritative foundation for 
moral law. She dismisses the possibility of alternative law-givers, arguing that “the 
concepts of [moral] obligation, and [moral] duty … and of what is morally right and 
wrong, and of the moral sense of ought, ought to be jettisoned if this if psychologically 
possible” (Anscombe 1981: 26). 
Foot, also in 1958, published two articles equally as damning of the moral 
philosophy of the time (Foot 1958a; 1958b). Just as Anscombe exposed ideas of the 
‘right’ as reliant upon an assumed authoritative legislator, so Foot attacked the idea that 
moral evaluations could be separated from a robust and shared concept of the ‘good’, in 
terms of human wellbeing. She shows that for ethical positions (on duties, rightness, 
obligations, goodness etc) to be intelligible (rather than simply logical), they cannot just 
be an expression of preference or approval. Rather, they must observe the commonly 
understood grammar inherent in each ethical concept, which links whatever it is that is 
being commended back to human flourishing in some relatively objective way. There is, 
for Foot, something concrete about morality, such that moral statements are connected to 
the factual rather than simply the interpretative, and can thus be judged as better or worse 
rather than only viewed as one among a range of equally plausible attitudes or 
manifestations of emotion. 
These articles brought about something of a revolution in Western moral 
philosophy, and were followed by a more sustained critique of moral obligation and the 
relation of the right and the good developed by Bernard Williams. Williams took 
particular aim at Kant’s ‘morality system’ and the damage to human ethical lives it 
threatens (Williams 1985: 174). Williams argued that the morality system is concerned to 
find general propositions about how to behave, through the ambitious use of the concept 
of obligation. It attempts to convert all of the ethical considerations that we may face in a 
situation (for instance, about responses to the situation that would be agreeable, or 
worthwhile, or heroic, as well as those which would be obligatory or demanded) into the 
language of obligation (Williams 1985: 179), and in doing so both impoverishes ethics as 
a rich and complex field of human practice, and also leads to an unjust focus on blame 
and blameworthiness. One of the fundamental assumptions behind Kantian morality is 
the freedom of the moral agent to act according to her reason. If agents are free and 
actions are voluntary, then actors who breach moral rules can be blamed (and, by 
implication, punished) for doing so. Williams was deeply sceptical about the kind of 
voluntary agency implied by the morality system as he thought it impossible to separate 
out the voluntary features of an action (the “focused, particularised judgment” that this is 
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the correct action to take) from the character-based or contextual features: “[t]here is a 
pressure within [morality] to require a voluntariness that will be total and will cut through 
character and psychological or social determination, and allocate responsibility on the 
ultimately fair basis of the agent’s own contribution, no more and no less. It is an illusion 
to suppose that this demand can be met…” (Williams 1985: 194). This point leads to a 
critique of the ‘purity’ of morality, “its insistence on abstracting the moral consciousness 
from other kinds of emotional reaction or social influence” (Williams 1985: 195), in 
order to support the Kantian ideal that human existence can be just. Williams noted that 
Kant constructed a system in which the good things in life, which are distributed in a 
non-just way (happiness, talent, health and so on), are relegated to being secondary 
concerns. The ultimate value is the value of morality, and one gains moral value by trying 
to behave morally. Kant effectively denied the role of luck as being important in living a 
good life – if moral value is the ultimate value, we can control whether we achieve it, as 
we are all free to follow moral rules if we choose to do so. Pure justice, therefore, is 
possible in human affairs – a position rejected outright by Williams (1981). 
The criticisms levelled at modern Western moral philosophy by Anscombe, Foot 
and Williams were persuasive to many who worked in the field. The seeds of discontent 
they sowed, coupled with their equally excoriating rebukes to utilitarianism as the most 
influential version of consequentialism (Anscombe 1958; Williams 1973; Foot 1983), led 
to a rejection of modern forms of moral reasoning in favour of a rereading of ancient 
ethics. 
 
Rejecting rules, reviving virtue 
 
The key difference between modern and ancient ethics, at least in the West, is in their 
central questions. Ancient Greek (and also Ancient Chinese, though this essay does not 
engage with Confucianism) thinkers were less concerned with the question “what should 
I do?” as they were with questions of “how should I live?” or “what sort of person should 
I be?”. These questions suggest a different way to make moral judgments, based on an 
appraisal of what is ‘good’ (i.e. leads to flourishing) rather than what is ‘right’ (i.e. is 
obligatory from the point of view of a moral law or a calculation of consequences). The 
implications of this shift in view are substantial and lead (back) to a distinct type of 
ethics: virtue ethics. 
There are as many varieties of virtue ethics as there are of deontology and 
consequentialism, and the chapter will not attempt to describe them all (see Foot 1978; 
2001; Geach 1977; Hursthouse 1999; MacIntyre 2004; 2009; Nussbaum 1993; 1999b; 
2000; 2006; Slote 2001; 2007; 2010; Swanton 2003 as a selection of the most important 
contemporary examples of VE; Sanford 2015 for a typology based on the relation of 
these approaches to Anscombe’s challenge to modern moral philosophy; and 
Athanassoulis 2004 for a typology based on the relative importance of the good, of the 
sentiments, or of particular virtues within each approach). Rather, some of the 
commonalities between virtue-based accounts of ethics will be explored through 
discussion of the exponent of ancient virtue ethics drawn upon most frequently in recent 
work: Aristotle (384–322 BCE). 
Contemporary virtue ethicists all locate themselves in some way relative to 
Aristotle, with the key tenets of Aristotelian ethics being broadly as follows: something is 
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good when it does its function well (so a good umbrella is one that keeps the rain off its 
owner, a good book is enjoyable or informative and so on) and the function of human 
beings, what sets us apart from other animals, is our reason. Therefore, the telos (purpose 
or goal) of human life is action in accordance with reason, as this will lead to eudemonia, 
or flourishing. Aristotle built from this an ethics detailing the virtues or character traits a 
person needs to develop in order to flourish (4
th
 century BC/ 1999). He noted that there 
are two kinds of virtue: moral virtues, including courage, temperance, pride, gentleness, 
agreeableness, truthfulness, wittiness, modesty (Books III and IV) and virtues of the 
intellect: theoretical wisdom, science (epistêmê), intuitive understanding (nous), practical 
wisdom (phronesis or prudence), and craft expertise (Book VI). 
The three concepts in Aristotle’s work which define virtue ethics are virtue itself 
(arête), practical wisdom (phronesis) and flourishing (eudemonia). All subsequent virtue 
approaches include comparable concepts, and see a strong relationship between the three, 
though there are substantial differences between contemporary works only gestured at 
here. The virtues, in general, are seen as consistent and, once acquired, relatively fixed 
features of a person’s character that lead to action. A person with a disposition towards 
kindness will tend to be moved by that disposition to act with kindness when appropriate, 
regardless of the costs of being kind in any given situation, and will be kind across time 
and to a range of different people. The virtues are acquired by practice – by performing 
virtuous acts repeatedly until being virtuous becomes habitual – and through processes of 
socialisation and education to encourage virtuous traits and discourage vicious ones. It is 
important to note in relation to modern moral philosophy that arête can also be translated 
as ‘excellence’ rather than ‘virtue’: virtues are not just those traits that we associate with 
moral behaviour as controlled by moral systems, but range much more broadly: “we 
reckon physical, intellectual and psychological qualities as virtues if they typically help 
people to live well and achieve great things; to create great works of art or scholarship, 
for example” (Cafaro 1998: fn11). 
Wisdom or reason is central to human life, but it should not, according to virtue 
ethicists, be employed only to gain theoretical knowledge. It also has a key role to play in 
guiding conduct, particularly important once the notion of a system of moral obligations 
or rules which can be relied upon to dictate right action has been called into question. 
Phronesis involves the knowledge and understanding of how to act in the right way, 
which comes about through sensitivity to context and the ability to perceive the morally 
salient features of a situation, including the good of individuals or groups involved. But 
phronesis must harmonise with emotion or the sentiments – reason does not reign 
supreme. Perception of the morally salient features of a situation means being empathic 
as well as rational, and the virtuous person should find that her reasons to act and her 
desires to act are in accord. This means that a concept of moral obligation is largely 
redundant in VE, as we should not have to fight our desires in order to act in the right 
way (Slote 2010 is a major restatement of moral sentimentalism which argues that 
empathy rather than reason is the foundation of our moral intuitions). 
The idea that acting virtuously brings happiness or emotional satisfaction to the 
virtuous person is central to eudemonia or flourishing. But flourishing does not consist in 
happiness (a subjective state), rather, it comprises an objective standard of a life worth 
living that is at least partly constituted by virtuous character and action (i.e. ethics and 
self-interest are not in opposition). Writers in this tradition have diverging ideas of what 
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human flourishing – the good – consists in, disagree about the extent to which standards 
of excellence can be divorced from their social context, and have varying views on 
whether individual flourishing is possible or whether it is the flourishing of groups, for 
instance families or communities, which should be aimed at to bring about eudemonia to 
the individual. However, all evaluate character traits according to the extent to which 
they bring about objective or intersubjective conceptions of human flourishing.  
The contemporary exponent of virtue ethics whose work is most relevant to 
international political theory and action is Alasdair MacIntyre (2004; 2009), though his 
stated concern is with ethics and politics inside the nation-state. In After Virtue (2004), 
an impassioned attack on the paucity of ethical life in contemporary liberal capitalist 
societies, MacIntyre explains that modern moral philosophy lacks purchase because it has 
jettisoned the ideas of a human telos or purpose and, grounded on this, justice as a shared 
conception of social order. This leaves political theorists unable to find procedures to 
adjudicate between the competing claims of individuals who hold interests and values 
assumed to be unrelated to those of others. Compounding their lack of firm foundations, 
modern moral philosophers and political theorists make claims to (varied, often 
incommensurable) universal values, ignoring the importance of context. Ideas are stolen 
from past ages to bolster universalist claims without reference to the social and political 
context in which the theorists were acting: “Kant ceases to be part of the history of 
Prussia, Hume is no longer a Scotsman” (MacIntyre 2004: 11). Without a conception of 
telos or an understanding of context, ethics becomes empty, and moral claims become 
incoherent. To remedy this, MacIntyre surveys conceptions of virtue through Western 
moral philosophy, and argues that a form of virtue ethics centred around ethical practices 
is necessary to rejuvenate ethical life and enable human flourishing. 
As has already been noted, VE is not a unified set of approaches, and MacIntyre’s 
position is among the most radical in the field (Scanlon 2015). He rejects the notion that 
virtues and or a substantive human telos could be universal, and invokes the concept of a 
practice to build an ethics and a politics that acknowledge the central roles in human 
flourishing played by communities and particular moral and political traditions. It is 
precisely this recognition that there exists a plurality of ways of life, across time and 
space, that makes MacIntyre so relevant to IPT. In place of universals, he examines 
concrete practices to derive both the meaning of the good and the virtues required to 
flourish. A practice, for MacIntyre, is: “any coherent and complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre 2004: 187). The links back to 
Aristotle are clear: excellences of character, or virtues, are required for, and partly 
constitutive of, flourishing. But flourishing is seen here as mediated through, or 
facilitated by, participation in social practices, such as playing football or chess, being a 
historian or a biologist, a painter or a musician. These practices provide two types of 
goods or benefits to those participating in them: external goods (money, status and 
power) and internal goods (particular physical, creative or intellectual skills, strategic 
vision, and types of knowledge). This leads to a definition of virtues as follows: “[t]he 
virtues … are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices 
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and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in 
the relevant kind of quest for the good, enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, 
temptations, and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with 
increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good” (2004: 219). It further 
leads to the necessity for those who seek to participate in practices to develop three 
particular virtues – justice, courage and honesty – because the goods of a practice can 
only be achieved by working together with others. Practices do additional ethical work, 
according to MacIntyre, providing narrative structure and intelligibility to our lives, 
reducing alienation and situating the self. And, connecting ethics to politics, practices 
presuppose the existence of a wider polis or community which supports them and values 
the goods internal to them, and is in turn strengthened as participants in the practices 
become cognisant of, and loyal to, the communal tradition embodied by those practices. 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre rejects Aristotle’s biological teleology that saw a 
substantive human telos as stemming from a natural faculty of reason, and makes an 
argument on sociological grounds in favour of a relatively weak telos: constancy or 
integrity. This leads to some frustration with his work, because despite his lengthy 
discussions of practices and virtues, there is very little in After Virtue that points us 
towards actual practices and virtues which might lead to actual human flourishing. In his 
more recent work he has revised his views and now argues it is impossible to entirely 
separate ethics from biology (MacIntyre 1999). The three key features of human 
existence that affect ethics, he now claims, are that we are dependent (on other people, 
particularly at the beginning and end of our lives, but also for the development of our 
ethics and our rationality), we are rational (a fact usually grossly over-emphasized in 
moral theory), and we are animals (with significant resemblance to and commonality 
with members of at least some other intelligent species). These three characteristics are 
linked, and MacIntyre argues that to flourish as an “independent practical reasoner” 
(which he now argues to be the human telos) we need to understand our deep 
vulnerability as animals and our mutual dependence with other humans throughout our 
lives for love, care, teaching, the development of reason and so on. The human condition, 
in this later work, is characterised as a form of “reciprocal indebtedness” (1999), and this 
new role for biology in his work enables MacIntyre to give far more content to his idea of 
the good than he could in After Virtue, including arguing in favour of specific virtues to 
help us grow towards independence (risk-taking, patience, courage and temperateness) 
and to help us live with our dependence (gratitude, courtesy and forbearance). While this 
essay does not explore the relation of virtue ethics to an ethics of care (Held 2005; 
Robinson 1999; Slote 2007), our dependence on others in the latest iteration of 
MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, and the extent to which our good depends on our contribution 
to the development of the good in others, clearly demonstrates the relation between the 
two. 
MacIntyre’s work, while only one of a range of contemporary virtue-based 
approaches, illustrates many of the strengths and drawbacks of virtue ethics. One of the 
principal advantages of the approach is that whole people and whole lives are understood 
as relevant to ethics – not just the narrow range of choices or actions judged to be within 
the field of ‘morality’ or governed by the language of obligation. This fits more 
accurately with our everyday sense of flourishing – living well is not just about doing 
right or wrong, but incorporates all of the areas of life that form our character 
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(relationships with others, participation in practices and politics, performance in social 
roles and so on). Flourishing, including the development of virtues or excellences of 
character is a life-long task, and the need for narrative unity in human lives is taken 
seriously within a virtue-based approach, because: “the good life cannot be discussed if 
the sense of that life is lost in its atomization into a series of unrelated acts” (Cafaro 
1998: fn6). 
VE is also attractive because it enables us to talk about human lives with a 
vocabulary that extends beyond ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Using ‘thick concepts’ to guide 
action, such as what counts as just or unjust, loving or cruel, kind or mean, wise or 
foolish and so on, can significantly improve the quality of our ethical understanding 
within and between cultures or traditions (Williams 1985: 140-143). 
We should not, however, expect that VE can bring us to substantial agreement 
over how to act in any abstract or general sense – there is nothing akin to the utility 
calculus or the categorical imperative within virtue ethics, nor methods to ground abstract 
moral claims such as implied contracts, imagined dialogue or reasonable consensus. The 
right thing to do in any situation is whatever it is that a virtuous person would do, but this 
is not determinable before the situation – the lived context – is known. We can talk with 
some abstraction about the nature of virtue, but only by developing phronesis and a 
virtuous disposition can we know how to act. Flourishing, however, is potentially a much 
more generalizable concept. There is a great deal of difference between virtue ethicists in 
terms of how objective they regard human flourishing to be – someone like Alistair 
MacIntyre, at least in After Virtue, saw flourishing as entirely dependent on the contexts 
and cultures (or, in his term, ‘traditions’) in which we find ourselves living and the 
practices in which we participate. Others, such as Martha Nussbaum (2000, discussed in 
more detail below) see flourishing in a way that is closer to Aristotle – something that can 
be read off the human condition rather than varying according to context. This position 
still does not deliver abstract guides to action, but it is grounded on a significant claim to 
objectivity that lends itself to rather more abstraction than most virtue ethicists are 
comfortable with. 
One of the most striking consequences of a rejection of the Enlightenment moral 
tradition in favour of virtue ethics is the recognition that there is no natural justice or 
underlying harmony to human life. Human flourishing is vulnerable to events outside our 
control and luck plays a profound role in ethical life: bad things can happen to good 
people and acting virtuously cannot by itself guarantee happiness (see Athanassoulis 
2005; Nussbaum 1986; Statman 1993; Williams 1981 for more on moral luck). Our 
vulnerability and interdependence mean that we need the protection of some form of 
society: the good life is only possible within a good polis, with social arrangements that 
are just and favourable to flourishing. 
However, there are many who find it hard to accept that ethics is so all-
encompassing, that there are no right answers to abstract moral questions and that moral 
life can be hostage to luck. VE does indeed place a heavy burden on the individual to 
develop ethical skills rather than obey moral rules, and ethics ends up as central to life 
rather than a side constraint upon the pursuit of interest. The ‘action-guiding’ objection 
tends to overestimate the level of agreement within modern traditions on what the 
morally right action in any given circumstance is, and underestimate the power of the 
language of vice to guide us not to be lazy, impatient, unkind, hypocritical, dishonest and 
 9 
so on. It is, however, certainly true, and, advocates would contend, absolutely to be 
preferred, that VE does not proffer responses to moral questions before they have been 
asked, nor offer shortcuts to moral maturity (see Louden 1984; Schneewind 1990; 
Swanton 2003: Chapter 13 for more on indeterminacy). The response to the problem of 
moral luck is similarly plain: we may wish that life was ordered by a benevolent creator, 
and our flourishing under our control, but wishing cannot make it so. The good life is 
precious in part because it is so fragile and our fundamental vulnerability cannot be 
reasoned away. 
Another objection to VE is the biological essentialism that Aristotelian versions 
of VE tend towards. Aristotle based his ethics on an essentialist vision of human nature. 
But the nature he ascribed to various humans – women and slaves in particular – we now 
find to be profoundly objectionable. So how seriously should we take Aristotelian views 
on the human telos? It is not essential to be essentialist in VE, and certainly not necessary 
to follow Aristotle in his views of particular types of human, but some objective standard 
of the good, however thin, is necessary. Objective here does not have to mean detached 
and applicable across all space and time, but susceptible to judgment with respect to 
concrete, embedded practices in particular contexts (across which the notion of human 
good may be interpreted differently but will not be unintelligible to those outside the 
practice). Defining the good, whether within practices or more generally, is as 
contentious as any attempt in modern moral philosophy to define moral rules. And even 
relaxing the requirement of objectivity of the good by linking it to practices does not 
ameliorate the problem: MacIntyre’s work has been rightly criticised by feminist theorists 
for valorising misogynist traditions in which the common good is bad for women (Olin 
1989: Chapter 3; Gutmann 1985). The role of tradition in flourishing within MacIntyrean 
VE has opened him up to the criticism of conservativism – reflecting the debates in 
political theory between Burkean or Oakeshottian positions on the inherent value to 
societies of tradition, and the views of more revolutionary thinkers such as Thomas Paine 
who recognised that traditions can become outdated or even harmful. Few would now 
defend slavery, or corporal punishment, or various forms of celebratory cruelty to 
animals, yet they were long-embedded traditions in numerous societies. 
Linked to the issue of whether there is anything we can know to be true of human 
beings in terms of their flourishing, are questions about what we can know to be true 
about human behaviour. Virtue-based approaches assume that once a person has 
developed virtues, these dispositions will be constant and fixed (though sensitive to 
context), driving their bearer’s actions even in the most difficult circumstances. Social 
psychologists argue, in contrast, that behaviour is determined more by situational factors 
than by stable character traits or virtues (Doris 2002). More recent research builds on this 
situationist critique to argue that even if stable character traits do exist, they are 
developed not because agents strive to develop them (as virtue ethicists argue), but in 
response to cultural norms, personal tastes or self-perception. If this is true, then virtues 
cannot have the kind of normative status required by virtue ethics - they have no more 
moral value in driving behaviour than a sweet tooth or an appreciation of jazz music 
(Prinz 2009). These are extremely powerful, and possibly devastating, critiques of virtue 
ethics, but they rely on answering empirical questions about behaviour about which there 
is deep disagreement (Sreenivasan 2013). Until the questions have been answered, there 
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remain good reasons to pursue a virtue-based approach, not least if the development of 
virtues can be shown to help actors resist situational pressures (Merritt 2000). 
If virtues do indeed drive behaviour, isn’t that behaviour self-centred, a kind of 
“moral grooming and preening” in the words of Jonathan Wolff, because the focus of the 
moral actor is on her own character and the achievement of her own flourishing rather 
than on the suffering of others (Wolff 2003: 121)? Responses to this objection to VE 
include the observation that a flourishing life is almost certain to include other-regarding 
virtues such as kindness, friendship and justice. Thinkers such as Iris Murdoch also show 
that a focus on the virtues actually helps us to see the “unself”, to “pierce the veil of 
selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (Murdoch 1985: 91). It is also 
worth considering, in response to objections of this kind, why we might feel that 
behaving ethically should not bring us fulfilment and why following our enlightened self-
interest (rather than an abstract notion of moral obligation) should not benefit those 
around us. Kantian philosophy and Christian theology have led us to expect that being 
good should not feel good, and that pursuing our self-interest is narcissistic, hedonistic or 
otherwise vulgar. But rather than leading to societies in which being good is common, 
this kind of moralising has led to individualist, alienated Western cultures in which issues 
that were central to ancient ethical debate: the definition of the good life, how to achieve 
fulfilment in relationships, how to be a good friend, parent, citizen and the like (and 
which have not become any less interesting to us or central to our lives), have been 
relegated from intellectual debate into the realm of TV talk shows run by self-help gurus, 
fiction novels and Hollywood films. The denial of self has resulted in an “extraordinary 
inarticulacy” about what constitutes our good, which is hard to see as beneficial for 
anyone (Taylor 2003: 18). 
Finally, and bringing us back to the rejection of the notion of moral obligation 
that stimulated the development of contemporary virtue ethics, can we really jettison 
moral rules entirely? Any empirical assessment of practices and contexts will show 
shared ethical standards or principles within them, suggesting that VE cannot do all of the 
ethical work in a society. It is hard to imagine a shared ethical life in which there were no 
principles: we would struggle, quite correctly, to regard someone as courageous for 
upholding the practice of slavery, and yet that judgment would be based on an ethical 
principle (the principle of equal concern and respect) rather than whether or not the actor 
was exhibiting a virtue. It would likely as not also be impractical to build a society in 
which there were no moral duties, as these can act as shorthand references for how to act 
virtuously in common situations. Sympathetic critics of VE argue not that rule-based 
moral theories should trump virtue-based accounts, but rather that the useful insights of 
virtue ethics are already incorporated into the best deontological approaches (Schneewind 
1991; Nussbaum 1999). Onora O’Neill (1996a, developed more fully in 1996b), for 
instance, argues that virtue ethicists reject Kant too quickly, and that if we reread him, in 
particular the Metaphysics of Morals (1996), we are offered a vision of how duty and 
virtue can combine. However, even if virtue ethicists will admit that principle and duty 
play some role in ethical life, their position remains fundamentally distinct from that of 
the deontologist, given their commitment to the view that life cannot be lived well 
without character, situated reasoning and some conception of flourishing at its core. 
 
Virtue ethics and international politics 
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As interesting as this approach to ethics is, the compendium project of which this essay is 
a part is concerned with international studies. What implications does the revival of virtue 
ethics have for the ways that states and people interact across borders? Answering this 
question is something of a challenge as there is virtually no literature on virtue in IR – no 
body of work that systematically or otherwise applies the insights of virtue ethics to the 
international realm. Virtue ethicists have been too little concerned, so far, with ethics 
beyond borders, and very few international theorists have made any attempt to think 
through virtue ethics as a specific approach to international problems. 
Despite the dearth of publications on virtue ethics and international relations, 
there is more potential for constructive engagement than might at first sight be expected. 
The rejection of moral obligation that inspired contemporary VE sheds light on the 
failings and perverse effects of rules in the international sphere. And there are various 
ways in which flourishing, character and virtue appear in IR scholarship – sometimes in a 
way which explicitly draws upon virtue-based approaches, sometimes more tangentially. 
Anscombe’s critiques of ‘law conceptions’ of ethics and Williams’ critiques of 
the ‘morality system’ highlight particular tensions in contemporary international affairs. 
The rise of liberalism in IR has led to ethical discourse being dominated by efforts to 
identify a universal morality in the form of rights that all human beings can legitimately 
demand from their own states and from foreign states, and by claims about the 
obligations owed by agents to each other in respect of their rights (Ainley 2008; Gaskarth 
2012). A great deal of work has been done to turn these obligations into international law 
– an unprecedented legalisation of international affairs took place post 1945, to the point 
where some now argue that a ‘global constitution’ has emerged (Dunoff & Trachtman 
2009; McDonald & Johnston 2005; Weller 2009). Certainly we now have a more 
complex and embedded web of international legislation than ever before. Yet despite the 
dramatic increase in law concerning human welfare (principally human rights law and 
laws on conduct in war) during the twentieth century, we also saw a steady swell of death 
and human suffering in conflict, genocide and atrocity. As Geoffrey Robertson notes: 
“[t]he twentieth century ended much as it began, in a world of small wars and occasional 
genocides combated by great powers if it suited their national interest” (Robertson 2006). 
The identification and codification of moral obligations has not, it appears, led to an 
improvement in human welfare. Despite claims of ethical progress in international 
politics – most notably the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the 
development of the Responsibility to Protect, almost nothing has been done to prevent or 
punish recent atrocities in Darfur, Syria and elsewhere (Ainley 2015). The existence of 
treaties and agreements on human rights has done little to avert gross violations of such 
rights in the US and the EU, let alone in Syria, Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Central 
African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Yemen – the list goes on (Amnesty 
2015-16). And one of the most heavily entrenched norms of international relations – the 
prohibition on torture – was breached extensively by liberal states post 9/11 (Blakely and 
Raphael 2016; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). These failures are in large 
part caused by, in Anscombe’s terms, the lack (and impossibility) of an authoritative 
legislator, meaning no deep and motivating consensus on the foundations of the 
international morality system is possible. The quantity of international law in existence 
belies its lack of secure and authoritative grounds (Gould 2010; Koskenniemi 2006). 
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Without such grounds, law, norms and rules can offer little constraint on the pursuit of 
interest by powerful actors (Hopgood 2013). 
Even when rules succeed in guiding behaviour in international affairs, harm can 
result. Lang and Beattie (2007a; Lang and Beattie 2008b) argue, for instance, that the 
rule-governed international order did not break down when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 – 
the invasion simply exposed the extent to which the current order still relies on coercion, 
hierarchy and the violence of enforcement (in this case of UN Security Council 
resolutions). Critical lawyers agree, arguing that law can be used to legitimise violence 
rather than restrain it (af Jochnick and Normand 1994), though Brown (2003) shows that 
in those instances when the use of force, in the form of humanitarian intervention, might 
be justified, a reliance on rules can delegitimise violence in the rare circumstances when 
it might be warranted. Lang also shows that the preoccupation with blame outlined by 
Williams is apparent in contemporary international relations, with punitive responses to 
violators of human rights and international law, such as economic sanctions, military 
intervention and counter-terrorism action violating the very standards they are designed 
to uphold (Lang 2008a). And Coker (2007; 2008) argues that contemporary culture has 
denigrated warriors and the idea of a ‘warrior ethos’, which has led, perversely, to 
increased brutality in war. He wagers that this is because it is not law, but the warrior 
ethos, that prevents atrocity in war – the character of soldiers rather than the rules that 
they are supposedly bound by. 
The critique of modern moral philosophy which led to the rejuvenation of virtue 
ethics can shine light on some of the problems faced in international politics. But does 
virtue ethics itself have anything constructive to offer? One of the few scholars to 
explicitly apply a virtue approach to IR is Martha Nussbaum (1993; 2000), though she is 
reluctant to label it as such (1999). While working as a consultant at the World Institute 
for Development Economics Research, Nussbaum became frustrated with the crude 
methods used to judge living standards (which tended to measure aggregate welfare, so 
ignore the specific, unequal conditions of women) and with a development community so 
nervous of seeming to privilege Western values that it was left without a language with 
which to criticise harmful practices. In response to this, Nussbaum sought to develop a 
cross-cultural and essentialist account of human flourishing. Her initial description of 
flourishing was heavily influenced by Aristotle: “Everyone has some attitude, and 
corresponding behaviour, towards her own death; her bodily appetites and their 
management; her property and its use; the distribution of social goods; telling the truth; 
being kind to others; cultivating a sense of play and delight, and so on.  No matter where 
one lives one cannot escape these questions, so long as one is living a human life” 
(Nussbaum 1993: 245). Nussbaum saw in common human attitudes and behaviour a 
baseline from which to critique cultural practices, compare living standards and build an 
objective account of flourishing. She fleshed it out (and shifted it significantly towards 
Rawlsian liberalism) in Woman & Human Development (2000), in which the main 
argument is a response to her observation in her earlier work (1986) on moral luck that 
much of the suffering in human life that appears to be outside our control is actually 
preventable by a just political order: a good state or polis. She presented the 
“philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that should 
be respected and implemented by governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what 
respect for human dignity requires” (Nussbaum 2000: 5), and produced a list of human 
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“capabilities” (Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination and Thought; 
Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; Control over ones Political 
and Material Environment) which are objectively valuable from an ethical standpoint 
(because they contribute to humans being able to live lives “worthy of a human being” 
Nussbaum 2000: 73) and as the object of an overlapping consensus or reflective 
equilibrium among people with divergent conceptions of the good. It is at this point that 
she lost her connection to Aristotle in favour of Rawls, and began to look increasingly 
liberal. Her liberalism was also apparent in the move from seeing functioning as more 
valuable in 1993 to promoting capability in 2000. She argues that it is inappropriate for 
any particular comprehensive conception of ethical value to be endorsed by politics and 
therefore did not see the production of virtuous functioning as a legitimate end of the 
state. She has moved even closer to Rawlsianism in her most recent work (2006). 
However, Nussbaum has succeeded in establishing the conditions for a just political order 
based, at least to some extent, not on human rights or fair procedures, more usually 
petitioned for by international political theorists, but on human flourishing. 
Nussbaum’s work has sparked a great deal of criticism. She claims to be 
influenced by Aristotle, the Stoics, Kant, early Marx, Rawls and feminism, and sought to 
‘appropriate the Greeks as allies of an expanded version of Enlightenment liberalism’ 
(1986: xvi) – thereby seeming to have committed the sin decried by MacIntyre of treating 
historically disparate theorists as participants in a single conversation (Nussbaum 1986). 
Her work is also criticized for its methodology – she gave no method by which 
overlapping consensus could be generated, so must have assumed that her earlier 
essentialist position (that there are certain functions particularly central to human life, and 
something that it is to do these functions in a truly human way) still held true, despite her 
move towards political liberalism. However, her application of VE to ethics beyond the 
nation state does serve to highlight the role of the polis in flourishing. She incorporated 
into her work the contention of virtue ethicists that, because of the centrality of the 
capability of sociability or affiliation, the good life is to be found in an active engagement 
in the community, rather than in protection from it. She also suggests that, as flourishing 
can only take place in a social context, then the state (or some kind of political 
organisation) is necessary to the provision and protection of capabilities, rather than 
being simply an institution of potential oppression. For those of us introduced to 
international political theory via the ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian’ debate, this 
complication of the distinction between universalist and particularist moralities is a 
welcome development. Virtue approaches reject characteristically cosmopolitan universal 
moral claims or approaches that purport to be neutral between ideas of the good. 
However, they do not automatically lead us to the particular or the communitarian. 
MacIntyre does tend to be categorised as communitarian, but he has explicitly rejected 
this label and Kelvin Knight (2005) argues that MacIntyre’s work is strongly opposed to 
oppressive communities that are part of the dominant order and polluted by the search for 
power and wealth. Community is not valued for its own sake and in any form within VE, 
but for its (necessary) contribution to human wellbeing. Virtue ethics emphasises 
universal human characteristics (our rationality, animality, interdependence, sociality and 
so on) as well as the ways that these characteristics can only find expression and be 
protected within (political) communities. 
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While few IR scholars have taken Nussbaum’s work on virtues forward explicitly 
(see Brown 2000a; 2000b as exceptions) many have revisited ancient Athens to assert the 
importance of some form of practical wisdom and/ or to explore the impact of moral luck 
in the form of tragedy. After a 50 year or so hiatus, realists (of the ‘neo-classical’ variety) 
returned to the texts of Thucydides (Lebow 2003; 2007) and Aristotle (Lang 2007), 
mostly by way of Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau, heavily influenced by Aristotelian 
thought, argues that in the pre-rationalist age there was an appreciation of “the tragic 
sense of life, the awareness of unresolveable discord, contradictions, and conflicts which 
are inherent in the nature of things and which human reason is powerless to solve” – an 
awareness lost in the Age of Science, to the detriment of men and of politics (Morgenthau 
1946: 206). These theorists (see also Brown 2007; 2010; Gould 2014) share with virtue 
ethicists the sense that the world is not morally well-ordered or in underlying harmony, 
and that unresolvable discord is best faced by political leaders in possession of the virtue 
of prudence. While prudence is a translation of phronesis, it is important to note that 
realist conceptions of prudence tend to diverge significantly from the Aristotelian 
conception of a virtue used to identify and understand the good in situations, and focus 
instead on the effective. “To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the 
political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political art is inevitably 
evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient 
actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In combination of political wisdom, moral 
courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny” 
(Morgenthau 1945: 11, quoted in Lang 2007: 29). Even further from an Aristotelian view, 
but also emphasising the importance of politician being able to be exercise good 
judgment, adapt to context or the ‘quality of times’ and cope with the accidents or 
contingencies of political life, is the work of Machiavelli (1965). There is, therefore, in 
more classical and conservative international political thought, a recognizable tradition of 
emphasizing the importance of the virtues and vices of political agents, even if this 
literature does not explicitly draw upon VE. 
A more radical approach to the role of prudence in international affairs was 
developed through the 1990s, when a group of scholars sought to challenge conventional 
rules of international politics and identify where responsibility lay to ameliorate harms 
caused (or allowed) by state action. These scholars (including Brown 2001; Jackson 
1993; Linklater 1998; Wheeler 2000) were concerned principally to establish the limits of 
state sovereignty and to interrogate the ethics of state action in the face of human 
suffering. Again, they rarely drew on VE, but they were centrally focused on the exercise 
of phronesis in situations in which states were called upon to intervene in the domestic 
jurisdiction of others.  
More recently, some significant work on character, drawing directly upon virtue 
ethics, has been carried out in the field of foreign policy analysis. This work focuses on 
the virtues exhibited (or not) by individual leaders in practice – in the ways that they 
make and justify political decisions (Gaskarth 2011). Using MacIntyre to postulate a 
practice of foreign-policy making within which decision-makers seek particular goods, 
Gaskarth argues that policy decisions cannot be made only in accordance with rules of 
international relations. There is significant room, therefore, for decisions to be affected 
by the character of decision-makers – a position he explores with relation to the values 
(in particular political will, belief and foresight) espoused by ex-UK Prime Minister Tony 
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Blair in his justifications of decisions about the 2003 war in Iraq. The values (or virtues) 
Blair privileged mitigated against the use of other virtues such as self-mastery, reflection 
and caution, and led to what is seen by many as a serious (and immoral) policy error in 
the decision to invade. Gaskarth concludes that a virtue-based approach would view 
reflection and self-correction, in particular, as essential traits to be developed by foreign-
policy decision-makers who wish to act ethically. The focus on character in this type of 
academic work is seen more centrally, though less rigorously, in biographies of political 
leaders, which almost always make great play of the virtues and vices of the individuals 
they profile. Finally, more tangential to virtue ethics, but worthy of mention are the 
theorists who have shown the importance of the identity, or character, of a state to its 
behaviour in international relations (Neumann 1996; Hall 1999; Reus Smit 2009). 
Without much mention of the virtue ethics literature, there has nevertheless been a broad 
range of work within IR, and a more limited range in IPT, concerned either with the 
critique of rule-based morality offered by virtue ethicists, or with the three characteristics 
of virtue approaches: flourishing, practical wisdom and virtue or character. 
 
Potential contributions of virtue ethics to international political theory and practice 
 
The final section of this essay outlines some of the possibilities that a more sustained 
engagement with VE approaches offers to theorists and practitioners of international 
politics and international law. One of the main difficulties in applying virtue ethics is the 
lack of a clear bridge from virtue ethics to politics. It is not entirely clear what kind of 
political system/s would be supported by VE, how political authority and political 
institutions could be justified with reference to virtue, or how to apply VE to political 
issues (Lebar 2013). Beyond suggesting that virtuous people have better judgment than 
the non-virtuous – hardly in line with contemporary democratic principles – can virtue 
ethics speak to international politics? Outlined below are moderate and more radical 
research agendas suggesting that it can. 
Gaskarth (2012) recognises the importance of rules, norms and structures in 
international political practice, but argues to extend the focus of IPT to include analysis 
and evaluation of the morality of the individuals who create and sustain them. These 
individuals both interpret their structural and ideational environments, and also impact 
upon these environments through their own character traits and moral projects. Following 
Jackson (2000), Gaskarth argues that global politics constitutes its own ethics through its 
practices – an ethics of statescraft – which is underpinned by virtues such as prudence, 
patriotism, public-spiritedness, forbearance and toleration (Jackson 2000: 21; 139). But 
Gaskarth believes that for the new solidarism evident in international affairs to flourish, 
different kinds of virtues will be required. Instead of the more conventional virtues which 
underpinned an international politics of co-existence or pluralism in the past, Gaskarth 
argues that virtues of, for instance, tolerance, respect, responsibility, empathy, justice, 
diligence and impartiality (2012: 444) will be necessary to sustain solidarist projects such 
as the expansion of international criminal law. Future research is needed to extend his 
study of the role of virtues in the rhetoric of international statespeople, diplomats and 
decision-makers within international organisations and non-governmental organisations, 
and to test his contention that particular virtues are necessary for the successful operation 
of international norms (2012: 448). 
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Klabbers (2013a; 2013b) opens up the possibility of a role for virtue ethics in 
international law – specifically through the concepts of a “culture of formalism” and 
“constitutionalism as mindset” advocated by Martti Koskeniemmi (2004; 2006). He 
argues that Koskeniemmi’s approach to indeterminacy in law is a form of virtue ethics 
(despite not being acknowledged as such) which entreats us to critically review action by 
politicians or lawyers by asking more profound questions than simply whether something 
is right or wrong. Klabbers acknowledges that many international lawyers would feel 
distinctly uncomfortable at the introduction of virtue ethics to their field, as international 
law (and law more generally) is founded on the notion that right action can be judged 
according to its relation to certain rules, rather than by the character of the interpreter of 
those rules. But Klabbers shows that positive international law already recognises that 
certain character traits (integrity, good faith and so on) are desirable in those who apply 
it, so sees significant potential to develop a substantive idea of a culture of formalism 
with reference to the kind of virtues it would require. He also sketches what the practice 
of such a culture in international law and, by extension, international politics might 
involve: “carefully retelling examples of both virtuous and non- virtuous leadership in 
global governance … [which] might not only draw on real-life events, but … could also 
let itself be inspired by literature and other forms of art” (2013b: 435). The filling out of 
this sketch would be a promising next step in the application of virtue ethics to 
international relations. This would complement work done by, for instance, Williams 
(2005), Sen (2009) and Frost (2009) on the role of engagement in and reflection upon our 
own histories and politics, on situated public reasoning, and on the development of 
‘ethical competence’ to produce better political decisions than result from abstract 
reasoning or rules. 
These approaches have in common (along with attempts in IPT to list the virtues 
that might be necessary to be a good cosmopolitan, e.g. Appiah 2006; van Hooft 2007) an 
acceptance, by and large, of the rules of the game in international politics. They use 
virtue ethics to advocate reform, but not revolution. But other, more radical, applications 
of VE suggest a different route. Work on virtue in conflict calls into question the laws 
and norms of ‘just war’ (Chan 2014; Davis 1992), arguing that legalist approaches to war 
and peace (exemplified by Walzer 1977) close down space for ethical argument just it 
should be opened up. Walzer’s reliance on the primacy of rules to restrain war, but lack 
of foundation for those rules (beyond a general claim about individual rights) and 
acceptance that the rules can be set aside in times of ‘supreme emergency’, leaves us with 
little scope for ethical consideration of killing and war. In contrast, Davis challenges any 
notion of necessity in war and starts to think through the implications of a virtue-based 
approach for war-fighting. Rengger (2002) makes broader points about the need for a 
return to casuistry and judgment in favour of rules, when lamenting the legalisation of the 
just war tradition and its change from being a discourse concerning statecraft, the 
purposes of political community and the ethical character of action, to a discourse limited 
to the morally tawdry and illiberal business of determining how much and what kinds of 
violence might be justified to achieve one’s ends. There is much scope for further 
research on the ways in which judgment and case-based reasoning can be used in place of 
rules to guide actors in international politics faced with decisions about whether and how 
to fight. 
More revolutionary still, MacIntyre (2004; 2009) offers a profound critique of 
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contemporary politics (domestic and international) which suggests significant changes 
are necessary to effect real ethical change. He sees politics as too often perverted in order 
to gain goods external to the practice (goods of effectiveness such as power or status), in 
fragmented societies with no shared aims or sense of the collective. He advocates not just 
a discussion of which virtues might improve public life or legal or political decision-
making, but the development of a shared idea of the good through a practice of politics 
that aims at internal goods, such as behaving with justice, generosity, honesty and 
integrity. The implications of his approach are weighty, including the casting aside of 
modern systematic politics, on the basis that “modern politics itself expresses in its 
institutional forms a systematic rejection of [the] tradition [of the virtues]” (2004: 255). 
The recognition here that structures can prevent particular kinds of ethical behaviour is 
important – and should be factored into analyses, including those from a VE perspective, 
which suggest that harm in world politics can best be ameliorated by concentrating on the 
actions or characteristics of individuals (Ainley 2011; Hoover 2012). MacIntyre is not an 
obvious resource for international political theorists – he does not believe that the 
common good can be established at the level of the nation state, let alone at the global 
level. But even if we do not retreat with him into village idylls small enough to allow for 
“shared deliberation [and] shared critical enquiry concerning that deliberation and the 
way of life of which it is a part” (1999: 161), research on the implications of the internal 
and external goods available through particular international political practices would be 
enlightening. Hoover (2016) does some of this work, building on Dewey and Connolly to 
demonstrate the potential of the virtues of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness to 
build an emancipatory politics of human rights. Beardsworth (2015) also notes the 
necessity for political leaders to develop virtues such as the ability to judge when to 
delegate sovereign power for the good of the citizenry, and the willingness to assume the 
risks of doing so, in an argument about the importance of political responsibility in 
contemporary statecraft. In a world of populist politics, increasingly divided (at least in 
the West) about values (Drum 2016; Lord Ashcroft polls 2016), invocations to use 
politics not just to gain power but to construct and defend a wider good are critical 
additions to contemporary critique. 
Virtue ethics offers resources to enrich ethical debate within and across 
communities, practices and ethical positions, and the central concepts of virtue-based 
approaches (virtue, practical wisdom and flourishing), along with the critique of rule-
based approaches to morality which inspired the recent revival of virtue ethics within 
moral philosophy, resonate with existing IR scholarship in ways which suggest more 
attention is due. 
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